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Tested by these general principles, I am clearly of opinion that
the libellant has not made out a case entitling him to relief.
The respondents had provided ample dock-room for unloading
the vessels consigned to them if they arrived in the order in which
they might reasonably be expected. By reason of slow sailing
qualities or bad management on the part of her master or crew,
the Hinchman did not arrive till at least six days after she was
reasonably due, and respondents were not bound to keep a dock
waiting for her all that time, or have one ready just one day after
her arrival. He is only bound to furnish him a dock in a reason-
able time after his arrival, and under the evidence in this case, I
do not think the delay from the 17th to the 2 1st unreasonable.
The city had, only seven days before the arrival of this vessel,
been visited by one of the most destructive fires ever known, de-
stroying nearly half of its docks, two-thirds of its stores and
warehouses, and rendering one-third of its inhabitants homeless.
I deem this alone such an intervention of unforeseen circumstances
as .xcused the delay which occurred, admitting that under ordinary
circumstances the respondents would have been bound to furnish
the vessel with a dock within one day after notice, there were ex-
traordinary circumstances controlling all persons doing business in
this city at that time ; to such extent, at least, as absolves respon
dent from the consequences of the delay charged in this libel.
Libel dismissed at libellant's costs.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND.1
SUPREME COURT Or PENNSYLVANIA.2
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.
ACTION.
Variance.-A contract was signed "Wolf Creek Co., per J. K. Sieg-
fried, Supt., [SEAL]" (a scroll seal); and also with the names and seals
of the other parties who were individuals. Assumpsit was brought
against the company for breach of the contract: the declaration was on
'From J. Shaaff Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 37 Ad. Reports.
2 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 71 Pa. St. Reports.
3 From J. W. Rowell, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 45 Vt. Reports.
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a parol contract; the written contract was given in evidence without ob-
jection. Held, to be a waiver of the objection that the instrument was
a specialty: Wolf Creek Coal Co. v. Schultz, 71 Penn.
Such variance can be taken advantage of only when the evidence is
offered: Id.
To take advantage of the form of action afterwards, the defendants
should have approved affirmatively that the seal was the corporate seal:
Id.
BILLs AND NOTES.
Competency of the Drawer of a Note to testify for the Plaintiff in
a suit thereon by the Endorsee against the Endorser-1When notice of
demand on the Maker of a Note, and of his default, is not necessary to
bind the Endorser.-In a suit upon a promissory note by the endorsees
against the executrix of the endorser, the maker of the note is a com-
petent witness for the plaintiffs, to prove that at the time the deceased
endorsed the note, he was indebted to the witness in an amount exceed-
ing the amount of the note, and that the witness owed the plaintiffs the
sum mentioned in the note, and that it not being convenient for the
deceased to pay the money he owed the witness, it was agreed between
them that the deceased should endorse the note to be given to the plain-
tiffs, and that he would pay it at maturity: Schley, .Executrix, v. Mer-
ritt, 37 Md.
In an action against an executrix, by the endorsees of a promissory
note, drawn payable to the order of her testator, and by him endorsed,
proof of notice to him of demand upon, and non-payment by, the maker
of the note, is not necessary to fix the responsibility of the defendant,
it being shown that the deceased endorser a-reed with the maker to pay
the note at maturity absolutely as his own indebtedness : Id.
CORPORATION.
Liability of Director.-Directors in a stock corporation, as to the
stockholders, are not technical trustees, but are as mandataries, and are
bound to apply no more than ordinary skill and diligence: Spering's
Appeal, 71 Penn.
Directors are not liable for mistakes of judgment, although so gross
as to appear absurd, if honest and within the scope of their powers:
especially where acting under direction of legal counsel: Id.
Directors are responsible to the stockholders for losses from fraud,
embezzlement, wilful misconduct, breach of trust: gross inattention or
negligence, by which fraud has been perpetrated, by agents, officers or
co-directors : Id.
,S ubscription Paper-Estoppel.-On the 19th of January 1869, the
defendant, a resident of Montpelier, subscribed for 100 shares of the
capital stock of the plaintiff corporation, of $100 each. At a legal
meeting of the commissioners of said corporation, of whom the defend-
ant was one, held December 20th 1869, the defendant, in presence of
said commissioners, annexed the following written condition to his sub-
scription: " Condition that good and responsible individuals in Mlont-
pelier subscribe fifty thousand dollars within one year from above date,
and a list of subscribers, and amount of each, given me January 19th
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1870." Held, that the true meaning of said condition was, that the
amount of the defendant's subscription was to be counted towards the
$0,00u named therein: Montp. & W. R. R. Co. v. Langdon, 45 Vt.
At said meeting, after the condition was annexed as aforesaid, the
defendant agreed that, if the plaintiff would procure $40,000 of sub-
scriptions from individuals in Montpelier, it should be a compliance with"
said condition; and thereupon said commissioners accepted the defend-
ant's sunscription, with said condition annexed thereto. The plaintiff
thereafterwards, and before the time mentioned in said condition, relying
upon the defendant's subscription and his said agreement, at great trouble
and expense, procured from good and responsible individuals in Mont-
pelier, subscriptions to the amount of $40,700, besides the defendant's
subscription, whereof the defendant was duly notified. Held, that the
defendant was thereby estopped from claiming that by the terms of said
condition the amount of his subscription was not embraced in said sum
of $50,000 : Id.
COVENANT.
Sealing by One where Instrument was intended to be sealed by Both
- Who is bound.-If two parties enter into an indenture or agreement
intended to be signed and sealed by both, but it is signed and sealed
only by one, it will be the covenant of him who signed and sealed it;
and the only exception to this rule occurs in cases of indentures of lease,
and in respect to those covenants of the lessee which are annexed to the
term, or depend on the interest therein, and which do not bind the lessee
unless the lessor has also executed the indenture: w: Nd. R. R.' Co. v.
Orendorff, 37 Md.
DAMAGES.
Stipulated Damages-Penalty.-By contract plaintiffs agreed to fur-
nish defendants all the timber they should require at their coal-mines,
they to pay at the rate of eighteen cents per ton for all the coal mined,
and should the tonnage during the year not amount to 75,000 tons, the
defendants to pay the difference between the amount shipped and
75,000 .tons at the rate of eighteen cents per ton. Held, the price
agreed on by the parties for the fulfilment of the contract was eighteen
cents per ton for 75,000 tons: Wolf Creek Coal Co. v. Schultz, 71
Penn.
Eighteen cents on the difference between the amount delivered and
75,000 tons, were stipulated damages, not a penalty : Id.
Whenever the stipulation is a measure to determine a damage which
would otherwise be uncertain and difficult to ascertain, it is a liquidation
of damages and not a penalty: Id.
M .asure of.-Garsed contracted to lease Turner a dye-shop, furnish
him work, &c., Turner to put in fixtures, which he did, and was ready
to perform the work. In a suit by Turner for breach of contract, no
oints being presented, the court charged, "if the contract was broken
y the defendants, the plaintiff is entitled to be put in the same posi-
tion, pecuniarily, as he would have been if the contract had been kept,
regard being had to the fact that the plaintiff soon afterwards obtained
other employment: Held, not to be error: Garsed v. Turner, 71 Penn.
VOL. XXI.-51
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DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Surety.
EQUITY.
Pleading-Scire Facias to revive a Judgment-Demurrer-Tudgment
Lien- Vendor's Lien-Practice in Equity-How a Person may become
a Party to Proceedings in Equity- Who may not impeach the Validity
of a Decree in Equity-Prchaser under a Decree in Equity.-To a
scire facias issued against the terre-tenants of T. to revive a judgment
recovered against him by the plaintiffs, it was pleaded that before the
issuing of the scire facias one of the defendants filed a bill in equity to
enforce a vendor's lien which she held arnd claimed against all the real
estate of T. ; that said lien had existed and attached long before the ob-
taining of the plaintiff's judgment; that said T. appeared and answered
the bill, and a decree was passed for the sale of said real estate, and the
same was sold by a trustee appointed by the court, and bought and paid
for by the defendants, to whom it was duly conveyed. To this plea the
plaintiffs replied, admitting the proceedings in equity to sell the real
estate of T., as stated in the plea, but averring that they were not made
parties to such proceedings; they denied that the complainant in the
equity suit held a vendor's lien on all the real estate of T., and averred
that their judgment recited in the scire facias was a lien upon his real
estate which was purchased by the defendants. To this replication the
defendants demurred. Held: That as the defendants by their demurrer
admitted that the plaintiffs were not made parties to the proceedings in
equity, and that the vendor's lien did not attach to all the real estate of
T., the decree and sale thereunder did not operate as a bar to the scire
facias, and the defendants' demurrer to the plaintiffs' replication could
not be sustained: Farmers' Bank of Maryland v. Thomas, 37 '3d.
. A person may become a party to proceedings in equity and be bound
thereby, by appearing to the suit and filing his claim, and having an op-
portunity of sustaining it by evidence, and of appealing from the ordei
of the court in regard thereto : 1d.
A party who comes into court seeking payment of his claim out of
the proceeds of land sold under a decree, will not be allowed to impeach
the validity of the decree in a subsequent proceeding; nor will he be
permitted to enforce the payment of the same claim against the land in
the hands of a purchaser: Id.
ESTOPPEL. See Corporation; Eguity.
EVIDENCE. See River.
Whole Conversation.-Tu action for timber delivered, a witness for
plaintiffs, on cross-examination, said in answer to defendants' question,
that he had told plaintiffs not to deliver any more timber, and asked
them to cancel the contract: the plaintiffs might properly ask him to
give the whole conversation: Wolf Oreek Coal Co. v. Schultz, 71 Penn.
This rule obtains whether the part of the conversation is brought out
by the direct examination of the party's own witness, or cross-examina-
tion of his adversary's: Id.
Irrelevancy-Competency of Witness.-A general objection to the
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
admission of evidence will not avail unless it appear that the evidence
was irrelevant or inadmissible for any purpose: Garsed v. Tumer, 71
Penn
The competency of a witness cannot be questioned under a general
objection to evidence: Id.
ExEcuToR.
Settlement of ExAcutor's Account-Presumption, after twenty years-
Rebuttal-Statute of .Tmitations-Trust Funds-Liability of Trustee
usizg the Trust Funds in his own Business.-After 21 years from the
grant of letters, an administrator or executor may answer to a citation
to account or distribute, the lapse of 20 years since he was liable to
account, &c.; but the presumption of settlement may be rebutted by
proof that in fact he has neither accounted nor distributed: Norris's
Appeal, 71 Penn.Letters'were granted to an executor in 1842; in 1865 a citation was
issued under which he filed an account, showing receipts and payments
in each year, and that part of the estate remained in specie. Held,
that the presumption of settlement was rebutted: Id.
Balances remained in the hands of the executor from year to year,
the money being deposited in bank to his private account, and used for
his private purposes. Held, that he was chargeable with simple in-
terest: Id.
An accountant may be charged as profits with more than compound
interest when he has used the money; and be punished by disallowing
commissions, &c. : Id.
An executor invested money of the estate in his own name, in stock
at a low rate; the stock rose in price. Held, that he was liable for the
dividends received, and the market value of the stock at the time of
the decree: Id.
- The purchase constituted the executor a trustee of the estate, and his
possession was that of the cestui que trust: Id.
Such possession of the stock by the executor was not adverse, the
executor having done no unequivocal act, denying the right of the cestus
que trust, and the Statute of Limitations did not apply directly or by
analogy : Id.
Investment of trust funds in a trustee's individual name is conceal-
ment : Id.
Imperfect information from a trustee as to funds invested in his
name, if calculated to give a false impression, is concealment: Id.
Where a trustee speculates with trust funds, he may be held to pro-
fits if the investment has been successful; interest if disastrous : Id.
When trust funds can be traced into a particular investment, it be-
longs to the cestui que trust if he so elect: .d.
An executor with funds of his own and of the estate purchased
stocks; when the investment with trust funds could not be discrimi-
nated, the cestui guc trust might select the most profitable investments
as having been made for the estate: Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE Op. See Sale.
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GROUND-RENT.
Covenantsfor-Redemption of.-A ground-rent was reserved to Perry,
the grantee covenanting, for himself and his assigns, to pay to Parry.
his heirs and assigns, the principal after ten years. H~eld, that an
alienee of Parry, after the ten years, might maintain covenant against
the alienee of the grantee - Springer v. Pillis, 71 Penn.
After the ten years, the owner of the rent continued to receive it;
the right to demand the principal did not thereby lapse and the rent
become irredeemable after that time: Id.
Such rent will not be held irredeemable unless the intent of the par.
ties to the deed is very clear to make it so : Id.
The policy of the law is to unfetter lands and make them freely alien-
able : 1l.
Parry covenanted that on the payment of the principal the rent
should be extinguished, &c., and that he, his "heirs and assigns," would
at the cost of the grantee, "his heirs an4 assigns, execute" a release
and discharge of the rent to the grantee, "his heirs and assigns." Held,
that the release was to be prepared by the grantee and tendered for exe-
cution to the owner of the rent: Id.
The action for the principal was a demand; the owner should pre-
pare the release and bring the money into court; his rights would there
be protected by a proper order: Id.
In this case the Supreme Court, in affirming the judgment below for the
principal of the rent, directed that the owner of the land have leave to
file in court a release, to be executed by owner of the rent and be de-
livered to the owner of the land on payment of the principal, and on
failure to file the deed in thirty days, execution might issue : Id.
INSURANCE.
Mortgage of Sip not an Assignment of Policy.-An insurance com-
pany executed to Trask a marine policy on a ship, "for account of whom
it may concern, loss if any, payable to assured or order; no assignment
of the policy to be valid "unless the consent of the insurers be first ob-
tained." He mortgaged the ship to Bell; and covenanted to keep her
insured, assigned the policy in blank and delivered it to Bell as collateral;
a partial loss having occurred, Held, that Bell was entitled to recover
from the.insurers in preference to a subsequently attaching creditor of
Trask: Ins. Co. of Penn. v. Phenix Ins. io., 71 Penn.
The transaction was an equitable transfer of the right to receive the
money, not an assignment of the policy: Id.
The relation of insurer and insured is one of confidence ; a stranger
cannot become a party to the agreement without the insurer's consent:
Id.
The premium note was not paid by Trask, and after the loss the in-
surer settled with Bell ; the amount of the note being allowed to be set
off, the condition against assignment which was for the insurer's benefit
was thus waived : Id.
LiMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See .Exeoutor.
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MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Evidence-How far Judgments conclude parties to the .Action-Puni-
tive Damages- When a Defendant is relieved from liability, by having
acted -under the professional advice of his Counsel- When .1alice may
be inferred from want of Probable Cause-Definition of Probable
Cause.-In an action for malicious prosecution in having the plaintiff
indicted and tried upon a charge of obtaining money and stock under
false pretences, a witness for the defence, a lawyer, in his examination
in chief, gave certain testimony, the object of which was to rebut the
presumption of malice, by showing that the defendant in instituting the
prosecution for which he was sued, had proceeded in good faith, upon
the advice of counsel, learned in the law, given upon a full representa-
tion of the facts. Upon cross-examination the plaintiff propounded to
the witness the following question, stating at the same time that its object
was to ascertain whether all the facts had been communicated to him :
"You have stated that with all the facts before you, you advised the de-
fendant that the plaintiff had been guilty of obtaining money under
false pretences ; please state what were the facts upon which that advice
was based ?" To this question and the admissibility of the matters in-
quired of, the defendant objected, for the reason, among others, that
the correctness of the opinion of the witness was not in issue, nor.were
the reasons or grounds on which he based it, but only the fact. that he
had formed and expressed it to the defendant: Held, That thc question
was proper, the object being to test the good faith of the defendant,
by ascertaining whether he or his agents had disclosed all the facts bear-
ing on the guilt or innocence of the accused, in his possession, in his
consultation with his legal adviser, and the answer to the question was
evidence for the jury: Cooper v. Utterbach, 37 Md.
A suit in equity was instituted in Virginia, the object of which was
to obtain a decree for the sale of certain land conveyed in trust to secure
the complainant's debt, being a loan to the respondent, and an appropri-
ation of the proceeds of sale in discharge of the same. The respondent
in his answer charged that the complainant cheated him in the trans-
action of the loan, and pleaded usury as well as fraud. Issues were
directed by the court to a jury to inquire whether fraud or usury had
been practised by the complainant on the defendant; the jury found for
the complainant; and the court thereupon decreed that he was entitled
to have the real estate sold for the satisfaction of his debt. Some time
after the equity suit in Virginia was instituted, the respondent was in-
dicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore city, at the instance of the
complainant, for obtaining money and stock from him by false pretences
-the charge growing out of the transaction of the loan. The accused
was tried, acquitted and discharged, and thereupon brought a suit
against the complainant for malicious prosecution. At the trial of this
action the plaintiff read certain proceedings and depositions from a duly
certified transcript of the record of the equity suit in Virginia. Both
parties, in fact., read from it without objection. The defendant con-
tended that the questions decided between himself and the plaintiff in
the equity suit in Virginia were to be taken as finally settled and con-
cluded between them, and no longer open to controversy, and the court
having determined in that case that the transaction between them was
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altogether fair on the part of the defendant, and not tainted by fraud or
usury, it was no longer competent for the plaintiff to argue, or for the
jury to find otherwise than as the court had pronounced it. Held :
That the matter directly in issue in the equity case in Virginia, was
the right of the complainant to a lien on certain lands therein, in pre-
ference to all other creditors, and to have said lands sold, and to the
extent of that issue the record was conclusive. But that the record was
not offered or used by either side, merely to prove the fact of the decree ;
nor were the depositions used to prove what had been testified to by any
particular witness in the cause who had since died or become disqualified;
but it would seem they were used by each side as a substitute for the
oral examination of witnesses not then before the court, who had been
examined in the equity case on the several matters involved therein,
which were also the subject of investigation in the criminal prosecution
and in the present action for malicious prosecution ; they thus became
original testimony, on which the counsel were at liberty to make such
comments, and the jury to form such conclusions as the facts warranted.
without regard to the final decree in the case : Id.
If in an action for malicious prosecution, the jury find that the prose-
cution originated without probable cause and in malice, they may legiti-
mately, if not necessarily, find from the same premises that the prose-
cution, if pursued, was persisted in for some private end, as the want of
probable cause and malice exclude all public motives, and so finding
they may give punitive damages : 1d.
In an action for malicious prosecution, it is not sufficient, in the ab-
sence of probable cause, for the defendant, in order to relieve himself
from liability, to show that he acted bona fide, and without malice, under
professional advice; the advice must be based upon a full disclosure of
all the facts in the defendant's knowledge, or which with due diligence
he might have known. The omission of any material fact, by design
or otherwise, will render the advice nugatory: Id.
In an action for malicious prosecution, if it appear that the defendant
aided and assisted in procuring the arrest and prosecution of the plain-
tiff, and aided in the prosecution, and that the plaintiff was indicted,
tried and acquitted, and there were no circumstances connected with the
transaction out of which the criminal prosecution arose, which could
induce a reasonable, dispassionate man to believe the plaintiff was guilty
of the charge made against him, and to undertake such a prosecution
from public motives, then there was no probable cause for the prosecu-
tion, and the jury might infer, in the absence of sufficient proof to satisfy
them to the contrary, that the prosecution was malicious in law: Id.
Probable cause means the existence of such facts and circumstances
as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the defendant in an action for malicious prose-
cution, that the plaintiff was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted: Id.
PLEADING. See Action.
RIVER.
Navigable S tream-Rights of Public, in the Highwazy superior to
right of City to use Water for Manufacturing, &.-3y Act of April
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Dth 1807, Kennedy was authorized to dig a race to his mill at the Falls
of Schuylkill, and lead so much water of the Schuylkill as might be
necessary for machinery, &c., with the proviso that he should not ob-
struct the navigation, and if the city should wish to erect machinery to
conduct water to it, such right was reserved, the city to be liable to .pay
Kennedy his expenses, and 20 per cent. on conveyance being made of
the whole of his right. Hdd, that the act granted a mere private right
to Kennedy, and the proviso in favor of the city gave her no right to
the water which would impair the navigation: Cty of P /ia. v. Gil-
martin, 71 Penn.
The rights of the public for navigation of the Schuylkill are superior
to those of the city, under the Act of 1807, and her contracts with the
Schuylkill Navigation Company: Id.
In a time of drought the water of the Schuylkill was so used by the
city as to prevent navigation. In an action by a boat-owner detained
by this use, Held, that the acts and declarations of the mayor, councils,
engineer, and other officers in relation to this matter were evidence
against the city: Id.
The city was a vendor of water to her citizens, &c., the officers having
direction of the waterworks, and the city stand in the relation of prin-
cipal and agent: they are not officers performing municipal functions
merely; the city is liable for their negligence and irregularities in the
scope of their duties: Id.
The right of the city to draw water for purposes of manufacturing,
&c., and also for baths, &c., as well as for propelling power, is subordi-
nate to the right of navigation : Id.
SALE.
Statute of Brauds.-When anything remains to be done by either or
both, the parties to a contract of sale, before delivery, the title does not
pass: Gibbs v. Benjamin, 45 Vt.
So inflexible is this rule, that when the property has been delivered,
if anything remains to be done by the terms of the contract before the
sale is complete, the title to the property still remains in the vendor.
The contract must be executed, to effect a complete sale : Id.
The mere delivery of goods to the vendor, is not sufficient to take a case
out of the Statute of Frauds; he must accept and receive them: Id.
SUBSCRIPTION PAPER. See Corpora'ion.
SURETY
Guaranty-Debtor and (reditor-Application. of Payments-D ii-
gence.-Davis was indebted to Sherman for printing; he refused to
do more without a guaranty. Woods agreed to "guaranty to Sherman
the contract made by him with Davis to the amount of $10,000."
Afterwards, Davis paid money to Sherman, without directing any ap-
propriation. Held, that Sherman might apply it to the debt due before
the guaranty: Woods v. Sherman, 71 Penn.
To recover against a guarantor, the creditor must prove due diligence
against the debtor or his insolvency, so that pursuit would be fruitless.
He need not prove both: Id.
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An execution was issued against the debtor, suit was brought against
the guarantor; two days afterwards the execution was returned "snulla
bona." Ifeld, primft facie evidence of due diligence : Id.
Reasonable diligence is a question for the jury : Id.
Ex vi termini a guaranty of a contract' is a concurrent act and part
of the original: Id.
Wrrds of Guaranlt.-oulter executed this paper: " D ue on demand,
&c., to Bayard or order, 100 shares S. N. Stock," on which Ashton en-
dorsed: " I hereby become security of Coulter, for the fulfilment of the
within obligation." Held to be an original undertaking by Ashton, and
Bayard might recover without proving diligence to pursue Coulter
Ashton v. Bayare. 71 Penn.
The dictum that the contract stated in ailbert v. Hen k, 6 Casey 205,
was a guaranty, overruled : Id.
TROVER.
Cbnditio'al Sale- Qfficer-D.,rnaqes.-The plaintiffs sold and de-
livered a wagon to one M. for $120, to be theirs till paid for. The de-
fendant, as constable, attached the same as the property of M., on a
writ in favor of P. & Co. against him. The wagon was stolen from the
defendant within three days after the attachment, and never afterwai ds
found. At the time df the attachment, $60 of the purchase-money re-
mained unpaid. Soon after the attachment, the plaintiffs gav e notice
of their claim to the defendant, and to PI. & Co., but no tender, or offer,
of the amount unpaid, was ever made to the plaintiffs. Judgment was
rendered against M. in said suit, and execution issued within thirty days.
The value of the wagon at the time of' the attachment, was $95. led,
that the defendant was liable in trover for the full value of the wagon,
and could not discharge himself by showing a loss thereof without his
fault: Duncan v. Stone, 45 Vt.
TRUSTEE. See Corporation; Erccutor.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See Sale.
Misreprescntatios.-Weist, without inspection, bought from IIickeor
and Coryell, the owners, silver mines, upon their representation that
they would yield a certain amount; the contract to be void if' Weis't
should not approve the report of a selected assayer. After his reports
Wcist paid a large part of the purchase-money; on working the mine,
by Weist, the product was only one-third of the representations. ffel,
That Weist was liable for the remainder of the purchase-money, unless
the misrepresentation was intentional : 1l'eist v. Grant, 71 Penn.
Weist having bargained for the report of an assayer before being
bound by the contract, and having acted on it, and there being no col-
Insion or fraud, he was estopped from alleging misrepresentation in the
inception of the contract : Id.
